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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER P. LARSON, an 
individual, and LARSON 
FORD SALES, INC., a 
Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
STEPHEN WADE, individually, 
and STEPHEN WADE, BRYCE 
WADE, KIPP WADE, dba SBK, 
a general partnership, and 
VALLEY FORD, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants/Respondents, 
Case No. 880344 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal from an order of the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick presiding, denying a motion of plaintiffs [hereinafter 
sometimes "the Larsons" or "Mr. Larson" as appropriate by 
context] for a one day extension of time to appeal a prior order 
of the district court dismissing plaintiffs' entire complaint 
against defendants on grounds of Utah's four year statute of 
limitations, Section 78-12-25, Utah Code (R. 73, 94, Add. 4). 
This court has jurisdiction of this appeal under Section 78-2-
2(3) (j), Utah Code. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the District Court err in denying plaintiffs' motion 
for a one day extension of time to appeal the district court's 
dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, where (1) defendants provided 
no notice of entry of judgment as required by Rule 58A(d) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, (2) plaintiffs' counsel did not in 
fact know judgment had been entered; (3) plaintiffs' counsel 
affirmatively told plaintiffs that the order had not yet been 
signed so there was no need to file a notice of appeal; (4) 
plaintiff Mr. Larson learned, one day late, of the deadline for 
filing a notice of appeal through his own efforts; (5) plaintiff 
Mr. Larson filed a pro se notice of appeal, that same day, 
through his own efforts; (6) the Larson family no longer resided 
in this state; (7) the Larson family's California home was 
threatened with foreclosure; and (8) one member of the Larson 
family was experiencing blindness and nervous breakdown, and 
another was suffering from traumatic neck injury? 
2. Alternatively, did the District Court err in refusing 
to permit Mr. Larson, who had come from California to the hearing 
on plaintiffs' motion for an extension of time to appeal, to 
testify or otherwise present supplemental evidence as to the 
reasons for which the notice of appeal was filed one day late? 
3. Did the District Court err in dismissing plaintiffs' 
entire complaint, including plaintiffs' claims in both tort and 
contract, because of bankruptcy court confirmation more than 
four years prior to the filing of suit, of a plan of 
reorganization put forth by an entity which is not a party to 
either this suit or to the oral agreement? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Rule 4(e) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court provides: 
"The district court, upon a showing of excusable 
neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing 
a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 
30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by 
Paragraph (a) of this rule. Any such motion which is filed 
before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte 
unless the district court otherwise requires. Notice 
of any such motion which is filed after expiration of 
the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties 
in accordance with the district court rules of practice. 
No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed 
time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order 
granting the motion, whichever occurs later." 
Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court provides in 
part: 
"...[T]he notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be 
filed with the clerk of the district court within 30 days 
after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from...." 
Rule 58A(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
"The prevailing party shall promptly give notice of the 
signing or entry of judgment to all other parties and shall 
file proof of service of such notice with the clerk of the 
court. However, the time for filing a notice of appeal is 
not affected by the notice requirement of this provision." 
Section 78-12-25 Utah Code provides, in part: 
"Within four years: 
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation, or liability 
not founded upon an instrument in writing.... 
3 
(2) 
(3) An action for relief not otherwise provided for by 
law. " 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a suit by plaintiffs against defendants for breach 
of contract, interference with business relations, breach of 
fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, conversion, and punitive 
damages (R. 2-9, Add. 1). 
Course of Proceedings 
By order entered July 14, 1988, the District Court dismissed 
plaintiffs' amended complaint in its entirety (R. 73-74, Add. 4). 
Thereafter, on August 16, 1988, plaintiffs filed a Notice of 
Appeal and a "Notice of Extension of Time to Appeal" (R. 75-78, 
Add. 5-6). 
Thereafter, on September 12, 1988, a hearing convened on 
plaintiffs1 "Notice of Extension of Time to Appeal," deemed to be 
a Rule 4(e) motion for extension of time to appeal, and the court 
denied plaintiffs1 motion (R. 89, Add. 8, 11). On September 14, 
1988, plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal from this denial 
(R. 90-91, Add. 9). 
Disposition in the Court Below 
The court below dismissed plaintiffs1 amended complaint in 
its entirety (R. 73-74, Add. 4) and thereafter denied plaintiffs1 
motion for extension of time to appeal (R. 89, 97-98, Add. 8, 
11). 
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Statement of Facts 
1. On June 24, 1987, plaintiffs filed their complaint 
against defendants alleging: 
a. breach of an oral contract to purchase Larson Ford 
Sales, Inc., to hold plaintiffs1 harmless from certain debts and 
obligations of the business, and to provide other benefits; 
b. interference with business relations in inducing 
third parties to breach their agreement with Mr. Larson; 
c. breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and 
conversion in that defendant Stephen Wade used his status as a 
bishop in the L. D. S. Church to acquire confidential information 
from the plaintiffs and thereafter used that information to 
convert substantial assets of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. (R. 1-7). 
2. On July 9, 1987, plaintiffs filed their first amended 
complaint which stated the same causes of action (R. 11-19, Add. 
1). 
3. On July 28, 1987, defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss 
(R. 7-8). 
4. Defendants based their motion to dismiss on the Second 
Amended Plan of Reorganization of Stephen Wade, Inc. in the 
bankruptcy case of Larson Ford Sales, Inc., confirmed on June 10, 
1983, more than four years prior to filing of the Larsons1 
complaint in this action (R. 34-36, Add. 2). 
5. Defendants never placed the confirmed plan itself into 
evidence in this action. cf. Record. 
6. Plaintiffs opposed this motion to dismiss by arguing 
that the statute of limitations constitutes an affirmative 
defense which must be affirmatively pled by way of answer (R. 47) 
and by submitting an affidavit from plaintiff Walter P. Larson to 
the following: 
(a) that he learned of the default under the oral 
contract only on June 24, 1983, within four years prior to 
filing, when he was ordered to vacate the Larson Ford Sales 
facilities; 
(b) that the $200,000.00 parts inventory converted by 
defendants was intact as of June 24, 1983 and that an official 
sale of the final $5,000.00 portion of those parts did not occur 
until eighteen months after June 24, 1983; and 
(c) that Stephen Wade, Inc., which submitted the plan of 
reorgnization confirmed by the bankruptcy court, was not a party 
to the present suit (R. 49-50, Add. 3). 
7. On October 19, 1987, Judge Sawaya took defendants1 motion 
under advisement and thereafter, on October 29, 1987, recused 
himself from the action (R. 53). 
8. On March 25, 1988, the Larsons1 counsel withdrew from 
the proceedings (R. 56). 
9. On June 7, 1988, Dannis M. Adamson and Peter H. Waldo 
entered their appearance as counsel for the Larsons (R. 70). 
10. On June 20, 1988, Judge J. Dennis Frederick heard 
argument on defendants1 motion to dismiss (R. 27). 
11. Judge Frederick signed an Order dismissing plaintiffs1 
entire complaint on July 14, 1988 (R. 74, Add. 4); the Order was 
entered that same day (R. 73-74). 
12. The record discloses no notice of signing or entry of 
judgment from defendants to plaintiffs as required by Rule 58A(d) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, cf. Record. 
13. On August 16, 1988, plaintiff Walter Park Larson, filed 
a pro se Notice of Appeal [Supreme Court Case No. 880386] (R. 77, 
Add. 6) and a "Notice of Extension of Time to Appeal" (R. 75, 
Add. 5). 
14. This notice of appeal was one day late, the last day 
for filing a notice of appeal being Monday, August 15, 1988, 
the thirtieth day after July 14, 1988 falling on a Saturday 
(R. 94). 
15. Thereafter, the Larsons' new counsel, John J. Borsos, 
noticed for hearing on September 12, 1988 plaintiffs' Motion for 
Extension of Time to Appeal, previously mistitled a "Notice of 
Extension of Time to Appeal" (R. 80). 
16. In connection with that hearing, Peter H. Waldo filed 
an affidavit stating: 
a. that he had discussed with the Larsons the option 
of an appeal of the dismissal; 
b. that he was not aware of the time of entry of the 
Order of dismissal; 
c. that no appeal was filed by his office due to a 
lack of communication with the Larsons (R. 87-88, Add. 7). 
17. At the hearing on September 12, 1988, the Larsons' 
attempted to present their reasons for filing one day late by 
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profer and by oral testimony because Mr. Larson had been in San 
Diego defending against a foreclosure of his home there, but 
Judge Frederick did not permit the Mr. Larson to do so (R. 91, 
95, Add. 9, 10). 
18. The Court denied the Larsons1 motion for extension of 
time to appeal [the order expressly reciting denial of "plain-
tiffs1 " motion in the plural form], (R. 89, Add. 8, 11) and the 
plaintiffs, on September 14, 1988, filed a timely notice of 
appeal to this court, which appeal is the basis of this 
proceeding (R. 90, Add. 9). 
19. Walter P. Larson filed an affidavit dated September 13, 
1988 stating the following: 
a. After retaining Adamson and Waldo to represent him 
in connection with the pending motion for dismissal, Mr. Larson 
returned to San Diego to report for a new job and to fight a 
pending eviction (R. 93, Add. 10). 
b. Mr. Larson's 20 year old daughter Rachel had gone 
blind in one eye and was in the midst of a nervous breakdown, and 
his 14 year old son Nathan was immobilized from a traumatic neck 
injury (R. 93, Add. 10). 
c. He had asked his counsel to request a continuance 
of the hearing on the motion to dismiss but this did not occur 
(R. 93, Add. 10). 
d. He did so because he had an affidavit coming from 
Connecticut for the hearing on the motion to dismiss but it had 
not yet arrived (R. 93, Add. 10). 
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e. After the hearing on the motion to dismiss, his 
counsel Mr. Waldo told him "that he would have no problem making 
an appeal or asking for a re-hearing and said he and his partner 
would decide which course of action would be best" (R. 94, Add. 
10). 
f. Mr. Larson then returned to San Diego to fend off 
the pending foreclosure (R. 94, Add. 10). 
g. Thereafter, he "called Mr. Waldo at least three 
times and was told the court had not yet signed the order so 
there was no need to file a notice of appeal" (R. 94, Add. 10). 
h. On August 15, 1988, Mr. Waldo called Mrs. Larson on 
another matter, at which time she asked him about the appeal to 
which he responded that "he did not know when the last day to 
file was" (R. 94, Add. 10). 
i. On calling the Clerk of the Court the next morning, 
Mr. Larson learned that the last day to file an appeal had been 
Monday, the day before (R. 94, Add. 10). 
j. Upon being so informed, Mr. Larson made arrange-
ments for the immediate filing of a notice of appeal that same 
day and a subsequent hearing on his motion for an extension of 
time to appeal (R. 94-95, Add. 10). 
k. At the hearing on his motion for an extension of 
time to appeal, Mr. Larson sought to present his reasons for 
filing an appeal one day late by profer and by oral testimony 
because he had again come from California for the hearing, but 
this was refused (R. 95, Add. 10), and the motion for an 
9 
extension was denied (R. 89, Add. 8, 11). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court erred in denying plaintiffs1 Rule 4(e) 
motion for a one day extension of time to appeal the District 
Court's dismissal of plaintiffs1 complaint, where (1) defendants 
provided no notice of entry of judgment as required by Rule 
58A(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, (2) plaintiffs1 
counsel did not in fact know judgment had been entered; (3) 
plaintiffs1 counsel affirmatively told plaintiff that the order 
had not yet been signed so there was no need to file a notice of 
appeal; (4) plaintiff Mr. Larson learned, one day late, of the 
deadline for filing a notice of appeal through his own efforts; 
(5) Mr. Larson filed a pro se notice of appeal, that same day, 
through his own efforts; (6) plaintiffs no longer resided in this 
state; (7) the Larson family home in California home was 
threatened with foreclosure; and (8) one member of plaintiff's 
family was experiencing blindness and a nervous breakdown, and 
another was suffering from traumatic neck injury. 
Alternatively, the District Court erred in refusing to 
permit plaintiff, who had come to the hearing from California, to 
testify as to his intent and to the reasons for which the notice 
of appeal was filed one day late and the case should be remanded 
for the taking of further evidence on the question of whether or 
not the notice of appeal was one day late due to excusable 
neglect or good cause. 
The District Court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' entire 
i n 
complaint, including plaintiffs1 claims in tort, pursuant to 
Utahfs four year statute of limitations, Section 78-12-25 Utah 
Code, solely on the grounds that Stephen Wade, Inc., an entity 
which is neither a party to the oral agreement nor to this suit, 
had obtained confirmation of a plan of reorganization more than 
four years prior to filing of plaintiffs1 complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURTfS REFUSAL TO EXTEND THE TIME FOR FILING A 
NOTICE OF APPEAL FOR ONE DAY SHOULD BE REVERSED ON GROUNDS OF 
BOTH EXCUSABLE NEGLECT AND GOOD CAUSE. 
In this case, the court squarely confronts the failure of a 
prevailing party below, in this case the defendants, to comply 
with Rule 58A(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and to 
provide to the plaintiffs notice of signing or entry of judgment, 
as a result of which, plaintiff's counsel did not know that 
judgment had been entered and affirmatively represented to 
plaintiffs that no judgment had been entered. As a consequence, 
no appeal was filed within 30 days after entry of the order of 
dismissal. 
Defendants should not profit from their omission. 
There is no Rule 58A(d) in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, however, Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules requires the 
Clerk of the Court to serve notice of entry of judgment upon all 
parties not in default. Rule 77(d) provides that "lack of 
notice of the entry by the clerk does not affect the time to 
appeal or relieve or authorize the court to relieve a party for 
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failure to appeal within the time allowed, except as permitted in 
Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure." 
Similarly, Rule 58A(d) provides that "the time for filing a 
notice of appeal is not affected by the notice requirement of 
this provision." 
Under the federal rules it is clear that, although the 
failure of the clerk to provide notice does not automatically 
extend the time to appeal, that failure is "certainly a factor in 
the excusable neglect determination" in the context of a motion 
to extend the time to appeal. KcGarr v. United States, 736 F. 2d 
912 (3rd Cir., 1984). 
This court has taken a similar approach. In Graco v. 
Ironwood Exploration, 735 P. 2d 62 (Utah, 1987), the lower court 
granted an ex parte extension of time to appeal, apparently on 
the ground that no 58A(d) notice was provided. This court 
remanded to permit respondents an opportunity to oppose the 
motion since the motion was made after the expiration of the 
initial thirty day period to appeal. This Court could have said 
that the failure to provide a Rule 58A(d) notice is not relevant 
in the context of a motion for an extension of time to appeal and 
summarily reversed the extension, but it did not do so, all of 
which indicates that this court does indeed view the failure to 
provide such notice as a factor to consider in the context of a 
motion for extension of time to appeal. 
In the present case, plaintiff's notice of appeal was only 
one day late. In fact, plaintiff caused a notice of appeal to be 
filed immediately upon learning that a judgment had in fact been 
entered and that the last for filing an appeal had expired the 
day before (R. 94, Add. 10). He did all of this despite the fact 
that he was residing out of state (R. 94, Add. 10). All of this 
should show to the Court that the plaintiff did indeed intend to 
appeal and that he did indeed rely on representations of counsel 
that no judgment had yet been entered, which representations his 
counsel would not have made had a Rule 58A(d) notice been 
provided. 
In Reagan Outdoor Adv. v. Utah Dept. of Transp., 589 P. 2d 
782 (Utah, 1979), this court considered then Section 27-12-136.9 
Utah Code, which required an appeal from a transportation 
commission decision to "be taken within 30 days of the commis-
sion's decision." It concluded that this language really meant 
that an appeal must be taken "within 30 days after reasonable 
notice of the Commission's decision," 589 P. 2d at 783. In so 
doing, it reversed the district court and saved the appeal from 
dismissal. This court did so even though the appellant had 
actual knowledge of the decision well within 30 days after the 
Commission's decision had been made. 
Certainly the plaintiffs in this proceeding, who had no 
notice of any kind until the time to appeal had expired, should 
receive one more day for the filing of a notice of appeal, 
particularly where Rule 58A(d) places a responsibility to give 
notice squarely on the defendants, and no such notice was 
provided. 
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In ruling on plaintiff's motion for an extension of time to 
appeal, the lower court had before it only the affidavit of Peter 
Waldo, prior counsel for the plaintiff, containing his explana-
tion as to why no notice of appeal had been filed. Mr. Waldo 
says that the option of an appeal was discussed but no final 
arrangements were made (R. 87, Add. 7). He further says that he 
was not aware that the order had been signed and was therefore 
unaware of the passage of time for an appeal (R. 87-88, Add. 10). 
Thus, from Mr. Waldo's viewpoint, the question of appealing was 
open but undecided, due in large part to the fact that to his 
knowledge no order had been signed and therefore no final 
decision needed to be made. 
From Mr. Larson's viewpoint, however, there is little 
question but that he intended to appeal (R. 94-95, Add. 10). 
This is shown not just from his affidavit but from his actions in 
filing a pro se appeal the very day he learned of entry of the 
order of dismissal and of the running of the time to appeal. 
It should be obvious from reviewing the affidavits of Mr. 
Waldo and Mr. Larson that there is a clear conflict between the 
attorney, who has other concerns since the time to appeal has 
expired, and the client who very definitely wants to appeal. 
Significantly, neither Mr. Waldo nor Mr. Adamson appeared 
with Mr. Larson at the court's hearing on plaintiff's motion for 
an extension of time to appeal (R. 89, Add. 8). Under these 
circumstances, Mr. Larson should have been permitted to explain 
as fully as he desired his intent to appeal and the reasons for 
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which his appeal was filed one day late. Instead, the lower 
court refused to permit him to testify in person at all, despite 
his coming from San Diego to do so. 
The intent of a party to appeal is clearly a significant 
factor in determining whether or not a motion for extension of 
time to appeal should be granted and has justified such 
extensions in many cases. United States v. Ford, 627 F. 2d 807 
(7th Cir., 1980); United States v. Reyes, 759 F. 2d 351 (4th 
Cir., 1985); Shah v. Hutto, 704 F. 2d 717 (4th Cir., 1983). In 
each of these cases, the appellants were aware of the deadline 
for appealing, yet their appeals were late because of mailing 
delays or for similar reasons. In each case, the appellate court 
concluded that the lower court would have found excusable neglect 
and on that basis ruled from the appellate level that the late 
filing was excusable. 
In the present case, Mr. Larson was unaware of the deadline 
for appealing, yet upon being informed of entry of the order of 
dismissal and the passage of time to appeal, he immediately 
caused a notice of appeal to be filed. In so doing, he demon-
strated his intent and his desire to appeal, notwithstanding (1) 
no notice of entry of judgment from defendants, (2) his counsel's 
ignorance of when judgment had entered, (3) representations from 
his counsel that the order had not been signed, (4) learning 
through his own investigation of the passage of the deadline for 
appealing, (5) immediate filing of a pro se appeal, (6) all while 
threatened with foreclosure and severe stress in his family 
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through illness. His late filing should be excused and under 
these circumstances/ the failure to provide notice of entry of 
judgment should be deemed good cause for a one day extension of 
time to appeal. 
This case is not unlike In re Buckingham Super Markets, Inc. 
631 F. 2d 763 (D. C. C. A., 1980), in which excusable neglect was 
found from confusion over which attorney would file the notice of 
appeal since it was clear that the appealing party wanted to 
appeal. In that case the court outlined the history of the 
federal rule: 
"The history of [federal rule] Rule 4(a) indicates 
that the excusable neglect standard has been applied with 
diminishing rigidity, and while extensions of time are 
not granted as a matter of course, they are available 
upon the proper showing. The civil rules did not provide 
for extensions of time for appeal at all until 1946. From 
then until the 1966 amendment, former Rule 73(a), Fed. 
R. Civ. P., permitted an extension of 30 days for filing 
a notice of appeal in a civil case only 'upon a showing 
of excusable neglect based on a failure of a party to 
learn of the entry of the judgment.1 [Citations omitted] 
The 1966 amendment to this exception changed it to read 
simply 'upon a showing of excusable neglect.' The Advisory 
Committee Notes to this amendment to former Rule 73(a) 
recognize that failure to learn of entry of judgment 
will constitute excusable neglect, but do not indicate 
what further grounds satisfy the standard, other than 
to emphasize that the district court should exercise 
its discretion to grant extensions of time 'where injus-
tice would otherwise result.1 Most recently, the 
Supreme Court again amended the rule, effective August 
1, 1979, to provide that time for appeal may be extended 
'upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause.'" 
631 F. 2d at 765. 
Under the federal rules, the clerk of the court is to 
provide notice of entry of judgment. Under our rules, the 
prevailing party is to do so. While there is some reluctance in 
l fi 
federal practice to condone late filings because of errors by a 
neutral party, i. e., the court clerk, there should be no such 
reluctance when the failure is that of the prevailing party. To 
hold otherwise is to permit the prevailing party to benefit from 
his own omission. 
Many practioners in this state view the Rule 58A(d) notice 
requirement as meaningless. In this case, however, its 
omission made a signficant difference. This case should be 
reversed accordingly. 
II. ISSUES OF FACT AND A CORRECT VIEW OF THE LAW OF LIMITATION 
OF ACTIONS AS IT APPLIES TO CONTRACT REPUDIATION REQUIRE 
REVERSAL OF THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only if there "is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In this case, the lower court treated defendants1 
motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment and ordered 
dismissal of plaintiffs1 entire complaint. 
A motion to dismiss assumes that the plaintiff can prove the 
allegations of his complaint, but asserts that the pleading 
should be dismissed anyway as a matter of law. Liquor Control 
Comm. v. Athas, 121 U. 457, 243 P. 2d 441 (1952). Since 
plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs submit that the 
allegations of plaintiffs' complaint must be accepted for 
purposes of this proceeding. 
Plaintiffs argue as they did below that it is improper to 
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base a motion to dimiss on an affirmative defense such as a 
statute of limitations (R. 46-48). The defense should be deemed 
waived. 
The district court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint, 
including those allegations sounding in tort, based solely on the 
fact that Stephen Wade, Inc., not a party either to the present 
litigation or to the oral agreement set forth in the complaint, 
obtained confirmation of a plan of reorganization more than four 
years prior to the filing of plaintiffs1 complaint (R. 40-41, 
Add. 2). 
The court did so without even requiring the defendants to 
place the plan of reorganization into evidence to determine 
to what extent, if any, the terms of the plan contradicted the 
oral agreement, cf. Record. 
Plaintiff submits that the mere confirmation of a plan of 
reorganization by a non-party to an oral agreement cannot be said 
as a matter of law to have started the running of a statute of 
limitations. 
Dismissal of plaintiffs1 complaint assumes that confirmation 
of the plan of Stephen Wade, Inc., a corporation, constituted 
breach by Stephen Wade, personally, of his agreements to (1) 
substitute his own collateral for the SBA loan as agreed; (2) 
hold plaintiff harmless from the SBA debt; (3) assume the 
citizens bank debt and obtain a release of that claim for the 
plaintiffs; (4) hold the plaintiffs harmless from State Sales 
Tax liability; (5) provide four dealer demos; and (6) provide 
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health and accident insurance for four years. There is nothing 
in the record to support these assumptions. 
The court apparently reasoned that the confirmation of the 
Stephen Wade, Inc. plan amounted to a repudiation of the oral 
agreement between Mr. Larson and Mr. Stephen Wade and started the 
running of the statute. But in so doing, the court never 
considered the terms of the plan itself, these never having been 
presented by defendants. 
As a general rule, a statute of limitations does not 
commence to run until "the cause or right of action has accrued 
or arisen." 51 Am Jur 2d Section 107, p. 679. A cause of action 
does not arise or accrue until the plaintiff "could have first 
maintained the action to a successful conclusion." Ibid. 
In cases of repudiation, this rule is further refined as 
follows: 
"[W]here one party has repudiated an executory 
contract, the adverse party has an election to treat the 
agreement as broken or not so to treat it, and although 
there is some authority to a different effect, the rule is 
generally established by the cases that where an action 
is brought after the time fixed by an executory contract 
for the beginning of performance by a party who has 
committed an anticipatory breach, the period of 
limitations runs, not from the time of such breach, 
but from the time fixed by the contract for performance 
by the defaulting party." [Emphasis supplied.] Limitation 
of Actions, 51 Am Jur 2d Section 132, p. 701. 
Thus, even assuming that the plan of reorganization repu-
diated the oral agreement, plaintiff could have sued for breach 
of part or all of that agreement, but that ability to elect does 
not start the running of the statute. That happens only "from 
the time fixed by the contract for performance by the defaulting 
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party." Ibid. 
What is that time? In this case, there was no set time for 
performance under the terms of the oral agreement and therefore, 
there was no set time for the statute of limitations to start 
running. 
Where there is no set time for performance under a contract, 
the law implies a reasonable time, and the statute of limitations 
does not start to run until a reasonable time has elapsed, 
reasonable time being a question of fact. O'Hair v. Kounalis, 23 
Utah 2d 355, 463 P. 2d 799 (1970). This question of fact alone 
precludes the granting of a motion for summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs submit that the terms of the plan of 
reorganization are not nearly so inconsistent with the oral 
contract as defendants imply. Plaintiffs further submit that 
the defendants know this as well and that it is for this reason 
that they never placed the plan into the record. But be that as 
it may, there simply is no adequate factual basis for the legal 
conclusion that the confirmation of the plan of reorganization 
started the running of the statute of limitations, whether on a 
theory of repudiation or otherwise. 
In opposing the motion to dismiss, plaintiff explained that 
it was not until he was actually evicted from the dealership 
premises on June 24, 1983 that he knew that Mr. Wade was not 
going to live up to the terms of the oral agreement. Again, this 
issue is not susceptible of resolution on the bare facts 
presented in the context of defendants1 motion to dismiss. 
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With respect to plaintiffs' tort claims, it is difficult to 
see how confirmation of the plan of reorganization impairs them 
at all. There is no repudiation theory, sounding in tort, which 
can start the running of the statute. 
This is particularly true with respect to the torts of 
breach of fiduciary duty and conversion. By affidavit, Mr. 
Larson has explained that the $200,000.00 parts inventory was 
intact when he left the dealership on June 24, 1983. Only 
thereafter could it possibly have been converted. By affidavit, 
Mr. Larson states that the conversion was not complete until 
eighteen months later, when what remained of the parts was sold 
for $5,000.00. All of this is well within the applicable statute 
of limitations. 
CONCLUSION 
The decisions of the district court to dismiss plaintiffs' 
complaint and to refuse to extend the time for filing of a notice 
of appeal by one day should be reversed. Alternatively, appellants 
seek remand to the district court with instructions to consider 
all of plaintiffs' evidence on the question of excusable neglect 
or good cause, under such guidance as the Court determines to be 
appropriate, and with further instructions on the law to be 
applied to the issues created by defendants' motion to dismiss, 
or such other relief as the court deems appropriate. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITED this <£ ) day of June, 1989. 
L. Edward Robbins 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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the following address: 
Gary E. Jubber 
Patrick L. Anderson 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents 
ADDENDA 
1—First Amended Complaint 
2—Affidavit of Stephen Wade 
3—Affidavit in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 
4—Order (of Dismissal) 
5--Notice of Extension of Time to Appeal 
6—Notiice of Appeal dated August 16/ 1988 
7—Affidavit of Peter Waldo 
8—Minute Entry on Motion for Extension of Time 
9—Notice of Appeal dated September 13, 1988 
10—Affidavit of Walter P. Larson 
11—Order Denying Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal 
3.32/7.16 
LORIN N. PACE #2498 
PACE & PARSONS 
350 South 400 East, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1300 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER P. LARSON, 
an individual, and 
LARSON FORD SALES, INC., a 
Deleware Corporation, 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
(Jury Demanded) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STEPHEN WADE, individually, and 
STEPHEN WADE, BRYCE WADE, KIPP 
WADE, d/b/a SBK, a General 
Partnership, and VALLEY FORD, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 
PLAINTIFFS for cause of action against the Defendants, 
allege as follows: 
General 
1. Plaintiffs, WALTER P. LARSON is an individual residing 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Plaintiff LARSON FORD SALES is a Delaware Corporation 
of which WALTER P. LARSON is the sole shareholder thereof. 
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3. STEPHEN WADE, BRYCE WADE, and KIPP WADE are individuals 
residing in Salt Lake County, State of Utah who are doing business 
as individuals and as a General Partnership under the name and 
style of SBK as well as VALLEY FORD. 
4, On or about the 10th day of Jan., 1983, the Defendant 
STEPHEN WADE entered into a verbal agreement with the Plaintiff. 
Whereby the Defendant would purchase and acquire the business known 
as LARSON FORD SALES from the Plaintiff, WALTER P. LARSON with 
SYBIL LARSON and 3 children as witnesses. Included in the terms of 
said agreement were the following: 
(a) The Defendant STEPHEN WADE agreed to 
substitute collateral for the Small Business 
Administration loan agreement and assume the S.B.A. 
loan to LARSON FORD SALES and hold Plaintiff, WALTER 
P. LARSON harmless from the requirements of said 
S.B.A. loan as guarantor. 
(b) Citizens Bank and Commercial Security Bank 
had made claim against LARSON FORD SALES and WALTER P. 
LARSON for $670,000.00 overdraft. STEPHEN WADE agreed 
to assume this debt to the extent he would obtain a 
release of said claim by which Plaintiffs would be 
relieved of this obligation. 
(c) STEPHEN WADE agreed to assume and pay the 
Sales Tax liability of LARSON FORD SALES in an amount 
of approximately $512,000.00 and to hold Plaintiffs 
harmless from the demands thereof. 
(d) Defendants agreed to submit on behalf of 
LARSON FORD SALES, a debtor's plan in the Chapter XI 
Bankruptcy and obtain approval thereof at no cost to 
WALTER P. LARSON. Such plan to include payment of 
$175,000.00 to WALTER P. LARSON, 
(e) To provide WALTER P. LARSON with 4 dealer 
demos for a period of 4 years. 
(f) To provide for WALTER P. LARSON and family 
health and accident insurance for a period of 4 years 
after the transaction date. 
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5. The above referred to verbal contract was based upon 
good and valuable consideration in that the Plaintiff in reliance 
on the assurances of Wade did not search further for a backer to 
support the Larson Ford debtor plan of reorganization exept for 
Wade and two other groups. 
First Cause of Action 
Breach of Contract 
6. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 5 of the 
First Cause of Action and make them a part hereof, 
7. Notwithstanding the agreement between the parties as 
set forth above, the Defendant STEPHEN WADE breached the contract 
with the Plaintiff in the following particulars: 
(a) No substitution of collateral was made in 
the S.B.A. loan case as agreed and the Plaintiff has 
been damaged in the amount of $509,000.00 and interest 
thereon at 19.25% since the 30th day of June, 1983. 
(b) As a result of the failure of Defendant 
STEPHEN WADE to settle with Citizens Bank and 
Commercial Security Bank and obtaining the releases 
for the Plaintiff, it was necessary for Plaintiff to 
employ counsel and engage in a grevous lawsuit by 
which Plaintiff was damaged in the amount of 
$100,000.00 
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(c) The failure of STEPHEN WADE to obtain a 
release from the Utah State Tax Commission and holding 
harmless, WALTER P. LARSON from the sales tax 
responsibility of LARSON FORD SALES has damaged 
Plaintiff in an amount of approximately $512,000.00, 
(d) The failure to submit an acceptable plan in 
the Bankruptcy Court Chapter XI Bankruptcy of LARSON 
FORD SALES which would protect the Plaintiff and 
cause payment of $175,000.00 to be made to the 
Plaintiff has caused a loss of $175,000.00 as well as 
the failure to receive $175,000.00 as agreed. 
(e) Plaintiff has suffered damages in the 
approximate amount of $50,000.00 for not being able to 
have the demo automobiles to drive for a 4 year 
period. 
(f) Plaintiff has been damaged by the failure to 
have health and accident insurance and the cumulative 
medical and hospital charges since that time have 
resulted in $20,000,00 damages. 
8. Plaintiff has been damaged in the amounts set forth 
above. 
WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays judgment as hereinafter set 
forth. 
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Second Cause of Action 
(Interference with Business Relations) 
9. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 8 of his 
introductory allegations as well as the First Cause of Action and 
incorporates the same by reference. 
10. Subsequent to the breach of contract by WADE as set 
forth in the First Cause the Plaintiffs negotiated an agreement 
with a partnership known as HGBH, a partnership composed of 
Owen C. Hogle, Dennis Gay, Stephen Bruno and James Hogle, Jr. 
11. In said agreement HGBH agreed to purchase LARSON FORD 
SALES on terms substantially similar to those set forth and agreed 
to by WADE as set forth in the First Cause of Action. 
12. Plaintiff believes and therefore alleges that the 
Defendant STEPHEN WADE communicated with HGBH and prevailed upon 
HGBH to breach its contract with the Plaintiff. 
13. The conduct of the Defendant was wrongful in that 
Defendant STEPHEN WADE, having breached his agreement with the 
Plaintiff, conspired with and induced the HGBH partnership to 
breach their contract to provide like benefits. This breach of 
HGBH was induced in order that the Defendant STEPHEN WADE could 
submit a creditors plan in Chapter XI Bankruptcy. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment as hereinafter set 
forth. 
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Third Cause of Action 
(Breach of Fudiciary duty and unjust enrichment and conversion) 
14. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 12 and 
specifically make them a part hereof. 
15. In the process of and concurrent with the negotiations 
involved in the contract referred to in the First Cause of Action 
herein, the Plaintiff made available to the Defendant confidential 
data and information in order that the Defendant could formulate 
and provide a debtor in possession plan for the Larson Ford Sales 
Chapter XI Plan of Reorganization. This information was provided 
STEPHEN WADE for the express reason that Defendant WADE gave his 
solemn word of honor as a bishop in the L.D.S Church that if 
Defendant WADE could not support a debtors plan of reorganization 
as agreed with Plaintiff that the Defendant would take no action 
whatsoever that would harm or injure Plaintiff, but would back off 
and not interfere with Plaintiff's debtors Plan of Reorganization. 
16. The Defendant STEPHEN WADE made use of the information 
received and with the afore mentioned assurances that Defendant 
would take no action to harm Plaintiff, he, together with his 
brothers, Defendant BRYCE WADE and Defendant KIPP WADE d/b/a SBK, a 
partnership took actions allowing Defendants to come into 
possession of the following assets. 
(a) J. & J. lease, value $1,800,000.00 which 
became the property of SBK while LARSON FORD SALES had 
substantial unsecured indebtedness and since SBK took 
the lease (approx. June, 1983) SBK has profitted in an 
amount of approximately $25,000.00/month thereafter. 
None of which has accrued to the unsecured 
indebtedness. 
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(b) Automobile parts inventory, value 
approximately $200,000.00. 
(c) Furniture equipment, value approximately 
$90,000.00. 
These above assets (a), (b), and (c) had been pledged by 
LARSON FORD SALES to the S.B.A. as security for the SBA Guaranteed 
Loan for which Plaintiff is obligated as guarantors. 
17. The Defendant having received the confidential data 
and information about the operation of LARSON FORD SALES, INC, did 
utilize said information such that based upon a claimed debt of 
$130.12 did submit a contrary and adversary Plan to the Plaintiff's 
plan as a creditors plan to the bankruptcy court which plan 
violated the contractual agreement between Plaintiff and Defendants 
as well as took an unfair advantage of confidential information 
provided by Plaintiff which use constituted a breach on the S.B.A. 
loan of LARSON FORD SALES, however, the assets were converted to 
the use and benefit of the Defendants and the Defendants were 
unjustly enriched thereby in an amount of $2,155,000.00 and the 
Plaintiff was diminished in a like amount to his damage. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment as hereinafter set 
forth. 
Fourth Cause of Action 
(Punitive Damages) 
18. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 16 and 
specifically make them a part hereof. 
19. The damages occasioned to the Plaintiff herein are 
substantial and are the result of intentional, malicious conduct 
calculated to unjustly enrich the Defendants STEPHEN WADE, BRYCE 
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WADE and KIPP WADE individually and in the form of SBK, a 
partnership, and of VALLEY FORD, a Corporation, 
20. By reason of the malicious conduct of the Defendants 
the Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages in the amount of 
$500,000.00. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays damages as follows: 
1. On his First and Second Cause of Action as follows: 
(a) Failure to substitute collateral and to hold 
Plaintiff harmless from S.B.A. loan, the sum of 
$509,000.00 plus interest at 19.25% per anum since 
July 1, 1983, even through the SBA had agreed to 
Defendant's proposal to substitute his collateral for 
the LARSON FORD loan and assume the said loan. 
(b) For failure to resolve the dispute with 
Citizens Bank and Commercial Security Bank in an 
amount of $100,000.00 with release for Plaintiff. 
(c) For failure to obtain releases for 
Plaintiff's liability in the amount of approximately 
$512,000.00 in Utah State Sales Tax matter. 
(d) For failure to submit the agreed upon 
debtor's plan in bankruptcy, the sum of 
$11,175,000.00. 
(e) For failure to provide demo autos for 4 
years the sum of $50,000. 
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(f) For failure to provide health and accident 
insurance for 4 years, damages in the amount of 
$20,000.00 
2. On his Third Cause of Action for breach of fudiciary 
duty and unjust enrichment and conversion for $2,155,000.00 plus 
interest since July 1, 1983. 
3. For punitive damages $500,000.00. 
DATED this JTfoday of V U ^ ^ / 1987. 
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ADDENDUM 2 
JUL 31 l2ssPH'87 
Gary E. Jubber, A1758 
Patrick L. Anderson, A4787 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER P. LARSON, an individual 
and LARSON FORD SALES, INC., a 
Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STEPHEN WADE, individually, and 
STEPHEN WADE, BRYCE WADE, KIPP 
WADE, d/b/a SBK, a general 
partnership, and VALLEY FORD, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
STEPHEN WADE, being duly sworn, states as follows: 
1. I am the President, a Director and the principal 
shareholder of Stephen Wade, Inc. 
2. I am a named defendant in the above-referenced mat-
ter and have personal knowledge of the creditors Plan of Reorga-
nization submitted on behalf of Stephen Wade, Inc. in In re 
Larson Ford Sales, Bankruptcy No. 82C-02186. 
AFFIDAVIT OF STEPHEN WADE 
Civil No. C^ 070427-3-
3. In early spring of 1983, the creditors Plan of 
Reorganization referred to in paragraph 1 was submitted on behalf 
of Stephen Wade, Inc., in connection with the aforementioned 
bankruptcy case. 
4. On or about June 1, 1983, a Second Amended Plan of 
Reorganization was submitted on behalf of Stephen Wade, Inc., in 
the Larson Ford Sales Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
5. On June 10, 1983, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed 
the Plan of Reorganization filed by Stephen Wade, Inc. and 
entered an order confirming the plan. Notice of the Confirmation 
Order was mailed to all parties in interest on June 10, 1983. 
DATED this day of July, 
h MM-
Stephen Wade 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this frO day of 
J^ ifte, 1987. 
NOTARY" PUBLIC" 
Residing At; h\J / {rf 
My Commission Expires: 
-2-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
,xn 
This is to certify that on this day of July, 
1987, I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the fore-
going Affidavit of Stephen Wade, postage prepaid, to Lorin N. 
Pace, Esq., Pace & Parsons, 350 South 400 East, Suite 101, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111. 
072987A:PLA 
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ADDENDUM 3 
LORIN N. PACE #2498 
PACE & PARSONS 
350 South 400 East #101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1300 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
tfALTER P. LARSON, an individual, 
and LARSON FORD SALES INC., a 
Delaware Corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
5TEPHEN WADE, individually, and 
STEPHEN WADE, BRYCE WADE, KIPP 
JADE dba SBK, a General Partnership 
tnd VALLEY FORD, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
TATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
OUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Walter P. Larson, being first duly sworn deposes and says: 
1. That neither he nor any agent knew that Defendant Stephen Wade, 
ryce Wade, Kipp Wade, or the partnership, or Valley Ford were not going to 
)mply with the oral contract made with Walter P. Larson until June 24, 
)83. 
2. It was only on June 24, 1983, that Plaintiff became aware that 
le Defendants would not honor their agreement. This happened when Plaintiff 
s advised on June 24, 1983, that he would be required to vacate the Larson 
rd Sales facilities. Until this time he expected Wade to perform on his 
ord of honor." 
OCT 13 2 uo PH '87 
AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Civil No. C-0704273 
CS7- i m 
J. The parts (value $200,000.00) pledged as collateral to SBA loan 
were intact on June 24, 1983. It was only learned eighteen (18) months 
later when an official sale took place that all but $5,000.00 (appraised) 
had disappeared. 
4. The reorganization plan was of Stephen Wade Inc. which organization 
is not a party to this action. 
DATED this IU day of _ Q o f c . > 1987-
Personally appeared before me Walter P. Larson who duly acknowledged 
to me that he had executed the above and foregoing Affidavit and that Che 
information contained therein is true and correct to the best of his knowledge, 
information and belief. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this J 6 day of Q g J T 1Q87 . 
Qfa mJiU>^-
Xbtary PubtLic 
My Commission E x p i r e s : * 
S'tZS^^j Residing At: j > A , CeUyh
 f \JU(J{ 
ADDENDUM 4 
Gary E. Jubber, A1758 
Patrick L, Anderson, A4787 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER P. LARSON, an individual, 
and LARSON FORD SALES, INC., a 
Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STEPHEN WADE, individually, and 
STEPHEN WADE, BRYCE WADE, KIPP 
WADE, d/b/a S.B.K., a general 
partnership, and VALLEY FORD, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
This matter came before this Court for hearing on June 
20, 1988, pursuant to Stephen Wade, Bryce Wade, Kipp Wade, d/b/a 
S.B.K. and Valley Ford's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs* First 
Amended Complaint. At the hearing, defendants were represented 
by Gary E. Jubber and plaintiffs Walter P. Larson and Larson Ford 
Sales, Inc., were represented by Peter Waldo. The Court having 
considered the memoranda and arguments of counsel, and good cause 
appearing therefor, 
ORDER 
Civil No. C87-04273 
(Judge Dennis Frederick) 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint shall be considered as a 
Motion for Summary Judgment and based on the record and the 
absence of any material issues of fact, plaintiffs' First Amended 
Complaint is dismissed with prejudi 
DATED this _ y ^ l day of «3ftfc, ,1988. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on this / /-' day of June, 
1988, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Order, to the following: 
Peter Waldo, Esq. 
5250 South 300 West, Suite 255 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
062188A:PLA 
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ADDENDUM 5 
WALTER PARK LARSON, PRO SE 
8505 £1 Paseo Grande 
La Jolla, California 92037 
(619) 459-2208 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT-,^ ^ , / 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER P. LARSON, an individual and : 
LARSON FORD SALES, INC., a Delaware : 
corporation, : 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. 
STEPHEN WAOE, an individual, and : 
STEPHEN WADE, BRYCE WADE, KIPP WADE : 
dba SBK, a General Partnership and : 
VALLEY FORD, a Utah corporation, : 
Defendants. : 
: NOTICE OF EXTENSION 
: OF TIME TO APPEAL 
: Civil No. C87-4273 
Pursuant to Rule 4(e) of the Rules of Utah Court of Appeals, seeks for 
additional time to file his appeal and alleges the following in support of 
this motion: 
1. Plaintiff is represented by counsel, Peter Waldo; 
2. Plaintiff has not received Notice of the time the time that 
Judgment of Dismissal was filed; 
3. Plaintiff is in the process of changing residence to California and 
has been out of the State of Utah during the month of July and until this 
date; 
4. Plaintiff conveyed to his attorney that he wished to appeal the 
dismissal action in this matter; 
5. plaintiff's attorney stated he would appeal or file motion for 
rehearing. 
6. The date of Judge Fredericks order was July 14, 1988, and under 
Rule 6 of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure would require filing an appeal by 
August 15, 1988. 
7. Plaintiff is presently in San Diego and is filing this motion by 
telephone and will supply necessary documents attesting to the truthfulness 
of these facts within 10 days from this date. 
Plaintiff hereby requests extension of the time for filing a notice of 
appeal for 10 days. 
DATED THIS 16th day of August, 1988. 
\uj&~ A X 
WALTER PARK LARSON, PRO SE wS<J,>i* 
CERTIFICATE OF HAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the above MOTION FOR 
EXTENSION OF TIME TO APPEAL was mailed postage prepaid on this 16th day of 
August 1988 to the following: 
Gary E. Juber and 
Patrick L. Anderson 
Fabian and Clendenin 
215 South State Street 
P. 0. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84151 
Peter Waldo 
Dan Adamson & Associates 
5250 South 300 West 
Busch Atrium Building, #255 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
ADDENDUM 6 
8505 El Paseo Grande 
La Jolla, California 92037 
(619) 459-2208 
Pit i'D III r,L Ef»r ^ tlFPlCS 
*IiGlb' / l - p " 1 ^ 
-el U 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
V 
WALTER P. LARSON, an individual ,and 
LARSON FORD SALES, INC., a Delaware 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : 
STEPHEN WADE, an individual, and : 
STEPHEN WADE, BRYCE WADE, KIPP WADE : 
dba SBK, a General Partnership and : 
VALLEY FORD, a Utah corporation, : 
Defendants. : 
: NOTICE OF APPEAL 
! Civil No. C87-4273 
Pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Rules of Utah Court of Appeals, Plaintiff 
makes this appeal based on the following information: 
1. Plaintiff is represented by counsel, Peter Waldo; 
2. Plaintiff has not received Notice of the time the time that 
Judgment of Dismissal was filed; 
3. Plaintiff is in the process of changing residence to California and 
has been out of the State of Utah during the month of July and until this 
date; 
4. Plaintiff conveyed to his attorney that he wished to appeal the 
dismissal action in this matter; 
5. Plaintiff's attorney stated he would appeal or file motion for 
rehearing. 
attorney has not filed either action and did not intend to do so. 
7. Plaintiff wishes to file this Appeal in his own right until such 
time as he can obtain another attorney. 
DATED THIS 16th day of August, 1988. 
WALTER PARK LARSON, PRO SE 4^ ^ , 5 
CERTIFICATE OF HAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the above NOTICE OF APPEAL 
was mailed postage prepaid on this 16th day of August 1988 to the following: 
Gary E. Juber and 
Patrick Lc Anderson 
Fabian and Clendenin 
215 South State Street 
P. 0. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84151 
Peter Waldo 
Dan Adamson & Associates 
5250 South 300 West 
Busch Atrium Building, #255 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
ADDENDUM 7 
UALTER PARK LARSdbC, frfrP Sti ~ » 
8505 El Paseo Grande 
La Jolla, California 92037 
C619) 459-2208 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JVofcTfaL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UALTER P. LARSON, an individual 
and LARSON FORD SALES, INC-, a 
Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs« 
STEPHEN UADE, an individual, and 
STEPHEN UADE, BRYCE UADE, KIPP 
UADE dba SBK, a General Partner-
ship and VALLEY FORD, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants-
AFFIDAVIT OF PETER UALDO 
Civil No-: C87-4273 
STATE OF UTAH 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Affiant being duly sworn deposes and says as follows: 
1- I and Dan Adamson were employed by Ualter Park 
Larson and Sybil Larson to represent them in matters before the 
Bankruptcy Court, and to represent them in a notion for Dismissal 
pending before the Third District Court- No arrangements were 
made for an appeal of said notion-
2- After the case was dismissed, we discussed with the 
Larsons the options to appeal and/or move to rehear the motion, 
the time and expense involved, and the uphill battle entailed in 
overcoming the Statute of Limitations defense. 
3- I was not aware of the time the Order of Dismissal 
in this matter was siqned by the Court, and therefore was not 
aware of the time that was running for appeal of said Order. 
4. Due to lack of communication with the Larsons, an 
Appeal was not filed by our office. 
5. During the hearing on the notion to Dismiss, I was 
asked by the Court whether I had filed an Affidavit on behalf of 
my client in opposition to the notion. I answered the Court no 
I had not filed an Affidavit, however, an Affidavit was filed by 
the Larson's previous counsel in opposition to the notion. 
Further Affiant sayeth not. 
fJ^j^/S£_ 
>eter H. Ual'do 
SUBSCRIBED AND SUORN to before me this _<£_^b_ day of 
^dCfZZilLl'&h-^., 1988. 
- - •-.:."' • ^  ^ "/. <—2, -, -.y - ^ ^ 
jft*.'^Y PC//ix?\ Notary Publ ic " 
ny 'C&jnm^^jfpjfonExpir.es: Residing In: 
ADDENDUM 8 
J Oewndant J 
CASE NO: ^ ^ / ^ V 7 ^ 
3 of hearing: Div Annul.. 
rant:. p<tf , - Deft.. 
tty: ' ' ^ K h K ^ ^ P a ^ -
tty: C ^ r ^ ^ ^ u J o b ^ y -
irn & Examined^ 
Deft:. 
srs: 
Supp. Order. OSC. Other. 
Summons. 
Waiver 
Stipulation. 
Publication. 
D Default of Pltf/Deft Entered 
ie: ~~^ , Q^nt^- rr<rl<?rf^\ 
Date 
Judg  
Clerk: 
Reporte 
Bailiff: 3^\GX_ 
)ERS: 
Custody Evaluation Ordered 
Visitation Rights 
• Custody Awarded To 
Pltf/Deft Awarded Support $ x 
Pltf/Deft Awarded Alimony $ 
Payments to be made through the Clerk's Office: 
= Per Month 
Per Month/Year • Alimony Waived 
Atty. fees to the. 
Home To: 
in the amount of • Deferred 
Furnishings To: 
Each Party Awarded their Personal Property 
Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Debts and Obligations 
Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Insurance on Minor Children 
Restraining Order Entered Against 
. Automobile To: 
Pltf/Deft. Granted Judgment for Arrearage in the Sum of $_ 
90-Day Waiting Period is Waived 
Divorce Granted To As 
Decree To Become Final: • Upon Entry 
Former Name of 
• 3-Month Interlocutory 
. Is Restored 
Based on the failure of Deft to appear in response to an order of the court and on motion of PItfs counsel, court 
orders / shall issue for Deft. . 
Returnable . Bail. 
Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, 
court orders the above case be and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice. 
Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, court orders 
•fC^cA \ ^ O r q j j ^ r l -A& - f W Co*.<\ O^d. ^ u ^ w r W o - j u2 
\* 3. 
ADDENDUM 9 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
807 East South Temple, #101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 533-8883 
*
 P id in p. »Mfpp 
H. C 
~<5" 
< ^ 
. ' Y G l C R I t 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD5:JUDI(^lr1HSTRliT?*t£RT 
^C2) s^P IN AND F0R SALT LAKE c a j N T Y , STATE 0F ^ A " 
WALTER P. LARSON, an individual and 
LARSON :-0RD SALES, INC., a Delaware 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Appellant, 
vs. 
STEPHEN WADE, an individual, and 
STEPHEN WADE, BRYCE WADE, KIPP WADE 
dba SBK, a General Partnership and 
VALLtf FORD, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants and Respondent. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. C87-4273 
Pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Plaintiff 
makes this appeal of a denial of his motion for extension of time to appeal 
based on the following information: 
1. Plaintiff was represented by counsel, Peter Waldo, in a hearing on 
a summary judgment on June 20, 1988; 
2. Plaintiff was not given Notice of the time that Judgment of 
Dismissal was filed, although tentative drafts of the order are believed to 
have been sent to Mr. Waldo; 
3. Plaintiff, Walter Park Larson, was in the process of changing 
residence to California and has been out of the State of Utah during the 
months of July and August and did not return until September 1, 1988; 
4. Plaintiff conveyed to his attorney that he wished to appeal the 
dismissal action in this matter and repeatedly contacted his attorney to 
discover when the appeal should be filed; 
5. Plaintiff thought his attorney stated he was going to appeal or to 
file a motion for rehearing, but due to not receiving notification of the 
filing date of the order, Plaintiff's attorney did not know that the order 
had been filed. 
6. Late on August 15, 1988, Plaintiff contacted the court and was 
notified that Plaintiff's attorney has not filed either action and did not 
intend to do so, 
7. On August 16, 1988, Plaintiff filed a pro se appeal with the Utah 
Court of Appeals; 
8. On September 12, 1988, instead of an exparte motion, at a hearing 
in open court on Plaintiff's motion for extension of time to appeal, 
Plaintiff's newly hired attorney, John Borsos attempted to have Plaintiff 
Park Larson present his oral testimony of the facts at issue. This proffer 
of testimony was objected to and such objection was sustained. Based upon 
the affidavit of Mr. Waldo and the notice of appeal filed August 16, 1988, 
Third District Court Judge, J. Dennis Frederick, denied the motion for 
extension of time to appeal. 
9. Plaintiff wishes now to appeal to the Supreme Court of Utah to 
grant Plaintiff's motion for a one-day extention of time to file its Notice 
of Appeal. 
DATED THIS '3 day of September, 1988. 
JOHN J. BORSOS 
AUorney for Rl/aintiffs and Appellant 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the above NOTICE OF APPEAL 
was mailed postage prepaid on this ^ day of September 1988 to: 
Gary E. Juber and 
Patrick L. Anderson 
Fabian and Clendenin 
215 South State Street 
P. 0. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84151 
Peter Waldo 
Dan Adamson & Associates 
5250 South 300 West 
Busch Atrium Building, #255 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
/} 
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ADDENDUM 10 
AFFIDAVIT 
Affiant being duly sworn deposes and says as follows: 
1. Lorin Pace was my attorney of record, and he filed this lawsuit 
against the defendants. (July, 1987) 
2. After I discovered that Mr. Pace had a conflict of interest in 
another matter he represented me in, I dismissed Mr. Pace and entered an 
appearance Pro Se in this matter. (March, 1988) 
3. Upon receiving notice of the defendants' hearing for a dismissal, I 
contacted Peter Waldo and asked him to represent me in the Stephen Wade case. 
Mr. Waldo agreed and entered his appearance. I had already paid Mr. Waldo a 
retainer to handle other matters for me. 
4. Because of impending eviction of my wife and 6 children from our 
California home of 14 years and to report to a new job for which I was three 
days late, I had to go immediately to San Diego and was unable to meet with 
Mr. Waldo. It was my intention to return to Salt Lake for the hearing. 
5. I called Mr. Waldo a number of times about the hearing and about 
his preparation and explained I could not get back to Salt Lake before the 
hearing date because of the illness of our 20-year-old daughter, Rachel, who 
had gone blind in one eye and was now in the midst of a nervous breakdown, 
and because our 14-year-old son, Nathan, was immobilized from a traumatic 
neck injury. I asked Mr. Waldo if he would request an extension of time from 
the court as new counsel so I could get back to Salt Lake to meet with him. 
6. Mr. Waldo said he did not like to ask the court for more time, that 
he did not think he would have a problem but did not rule out asking for a 
continuation. 
7. I called Mr. Waldo the Friday before the hearing to see if he got 
the extension. He said "No." I explained I had an affidavit on the way to 
me from Connecticut but it had been sent to San Diego and had not arrived 
yet, and I would have to leave the next morning to drive to Salt Lake. 
Waldo had not reviewed the legal file until that morning—the day of the 
hearing, (June 20, 1988) 
9. The Defendant was dismissed in the hearing. 
10. Mr. Waldo told me in the courtroom after the hearing that he would 
have no problem making an appeal or asking for a re-hearing and said he and 
his partner would decide which course of action would be best. He then was 
out of town, and I couldn't discuss the case with him. 
11. I had to return to San Diego because again my home was threatened 
by foreclosure and I had to continue to attempt to borrow monies and obtain 
subordination agreements. I called Mr. Waldo at least three times and was 
told the court had not yet signed the order so there was no need to file a 
notice of appeal. Mr. Waldo at that time reminded me that the appeal would 
cost money. I explained that I was contacting a friend who had agreed to 
advance the money for me. 
12. I talked by phone to Dan Adamson, senior partner of the firm, who 
told me he did not know how much of the retainer was left because their 
accounting system was out of order. I never received a statement from the 
law firm. 
13. On August 15, 1988, Mr. Waldo called my wife in San Diego on 
another matter late in the day. She asked Mr. Waldo about the appeal he was 
going to file, and Mr. Waldo replied that he did not know when the last day 
to file was. 
14. I called the Clerk of the Court early the next morning and was told 
the last day to file was the day before, Monday. 
15. I called Mr. John Borsos and asked him to file in my name for an 
extension of time to appeal and also to file a notice of appeal. 
2 
17. On Friday, September 9, 1988, I asked Mr. Borsos to represent me 
and enter an appearance in time for the hearing. 
18. Mr. Borsos told me he thought the affidavit I had prepared to 
explain all of this was not needed because I had come all the way from 
California for the hearing and I could give direct testimony to the court in 
lieu of the Ex Parte hearing that we were entitled to have. 
19. At the time of the hearing, I was not allowed to speak. 
20. T assure the court I have a substantial case to present with 
arguments that are well founded in law with yery impressive evidence, and I 
beg the court for the opportunity to present my case as it means a great deal 
to me and my family. 
21. Mr. Borsos has agreed to represent me in future proceedings. 
Walter P. Larson 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /.? " day of J<J»/<(t+JtLs. 1988, 
"-£^1, 
-X - /£z^ 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: Residing in: 
t'lt-S Y Aiif/jL C^u^Z, 
3 
ADDENDUM 11 
/ 
Gary E. Jubber, A1758 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER P. LARSON, an individual 
and LARSON FORD SALES, INC., 
a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
STEPHEN WADE, an individual, 
and STEPHEN WADE, BRYCE WADE, 
KIPP WADE, dba SVK, a general 
partnership and VALLEY FORD, a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal 
(mistitled "Notice of Extension of Time to Appeal") dated August 
16, 1988, came on for hearing before the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick in his courtroom on September 12, 1988; John J. Borsos 
appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs, Walter P. Larson and 
Larson Ford Sales, Inc. and Gary E. Jubber, Fabian & Clendenin, 
appearing on behalf of the defendants. After consideration of 
the pleadings on file herein, the arguments of counsel and the 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
EXTENSION OF TIME TO 
APPEAL 
Civil No. C87-04273 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
affidavit of Peter Waldo submitted to the court at the time of 
the hearing, the court found that there had been an insufficient 
showing of excusable neglect or good cause, as required by Rule 
4(e) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, by the 
plaintiffs/appellants to extend the time for filing a notice of 
appeal. Based upon the foregoing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Extension of 
Time to Appeal (mistitled "Notice of Extension of Time to 
Appeal") is denied. i 
DATED th i s ^/tL<3£y of Jh] ' 1988. 
BY THE/JCOURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
nnis/Frederick 
.W^)cru4^^ 
J9hn J, Bprsos By — 
Attorney'^for Walter Park Larson and 
Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this /(<? day of 
^^fjiXl/li^AJ f 1988, I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
-2-
correct copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion for Extension 
of Time to Appeal to: 
Peter Waldo 
Dan Adamson & Associates 
5250 South 300 West 
Busch Atrium Building, #255 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
<w^.i ^&A-UdC. 
^yl 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this or day of 
3 t 19 88/ I mailed, postage prepaid/ a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion for Extension 
of Time to Appeal to: 
''Peter Waldo 
Dan Adamson & Associates 
5250 South 300 West 
Busch Atrium Building, #255 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
/dohn J, Borsos 
807 East South Temple, #101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
•Gary E. Jubber 
Fabian & Clendenin 
215 South State, #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
GEJ:091288A 
f the Court 
-3-
